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Strategic communications play a vital role in the fight against terrorist groups, 
especially in Muslim nations. This thesis analyzes the United States’ policies and 
strategic communications in the post-September 11, 2001, war against 
Islamic fundamentalists to determine if U.S. strategic communication policies have been 
effective in countering Islamic extremism. From the findings, it is evident that U.S. 
strategic communications have failed in countering radicalization and moderating the 
minds of Muslim populations overseas—or among diaspora populations in Western 
countries. Marginalization and poor assimilation strategies; awkward distribution of 
competencies between the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon, and the State 
Department; a lack of global perspective; and failure to learn from past military 
operations are some of the factors that have contributed to the problem. 
Reinstatement of a central agency for strategic communications, modeling of 
solutions for specific groups, and analysis of historical war successes and failures 
are important in ensuring the effectiveness of strategic communications in the fight 
against terrorist groups.  
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Even though major combat operations have ended in Iraq, and the United States 
started drawing down forces in Afghanistan in 2014, the global war on terror is far from 
over. Although crippled after more than ten years of U.S. military actions, Al Qaeda and 
its affiliates are not defeated, with elements still operating in Africa, the Arabian 
Peninsula, Pakistan, and Southeast Asia. Up until now in the global war on terror, the 
United States has relied principally on hard power—the use of military and economic 
forces to coerce others—to press its goals. While these measures have been effective 
insofar as causing regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan and materially disrupting the 
terrorist operations of Al Qaeda and other such radical Islamic groups the world over, 
they have not garnered much support for U.S. priorities in the Muslim world.  
With the United States now looking to minimize its physical armed presence in 
these places, and with the local populations increasingly mobilized against U.S. hard-
power measures such as the use of drone strikes, a new approach and new methods may 
be necessary. Arguably, it is time for the United States to reacquaint itself with soft 
power—the use of a nation’s economic, cultural, foreign policy, and political influence 
(the core elements of strategic communications) to co-opt others—to finish the job that 
started on September 11, 2001, and to bring lasting results in the fight against radical 
Islam. 
The 21st century has seen a spread of extremist ideology in Asia and Africa. For 
instance, Somali-based and Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamist terrorist group, Harakat Al-
Shabab al-Mujahideen, which was an offshoot of the Islamic courts union, has 
strengthened on the Horn of Africa. The group spreads messages similar to those of Al 
Qaeda and has attacked American and Western interests in other African countries such 
as Uganda and Kenya.  
In Asia and the Middle East, the Islamic State (IS) has undergone a 15-year 
evolution since its inception in 1999. IS is currently based in Iraq and Syria, but its roots 
lie in Afghanistan and Jordan. IS has advanced considerably, transforming from a few 
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small and sloppily structured terror cells nearly eradicated by Western forces to a large 
organization fixated on leading an Islamic caliphate across current national borders. In 
this progression, IS and its predecessors have experienced a substantial process of 
organizational and operational learning. Through its remarkable advances across large 
regions of Syria and Iraq in 2013 and 2014, IS has debatably proven a more effective 
organization than Al Qaeda. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis analyzes the U.S. strategic communications and foreign policies in the 
war against Muslim violent extremists from September 11, 2001, until the present to 
determine if U.S. policies—which have focused on hard power—have been effective, or 
if they have helped to increase the radicalization of Muslims around the world. What is 
the public message and the public response? This effort is vital because many terrorist 
organizations and insurgencies rely on the support of the public for financing, manpower, 
and sanctuary, among other things.  
In the current fight against Al Qaeda, IS, and other groups affiliated to them in 
various parts of the world, “the public” includes not only America, but also Muslim 
nations and diaspora populations around the world. Therefore, U.S. policies and their 
implementation may need to take into account the thoughts, feelings, and social 
impressions of each group of citizens.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
Strategic communications are at the heart of any successful, long-term U.S. 
counterterrorism campaign. The U.S. government must understand, according to 
Christopher Paul, that “perceptions and understandings of images, policies, and actions 
matter, that the success of many policies is contingent on the support they receive from 
various populations, and that perceptions are influenced both by what you do and what 
you say.”1 So, for example, when the U.S. government advocates spreading democracy to 
the world, yet continues to support despotic regimes in the Middle East, this disconnect 
                                                 
1 Christopher Paul, Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates (Santa 
Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 1. 
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gives Al Qaeda the impetus to call out U.S. duplicity and weakens support for the United 
States in the region.  
Washington also has relied heavily on its hard-power capabilities in the fight 
against Al Qaeda, with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the use of drone strikes 
in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Yemen. Each of these actions provided U.S. enemies 
with a substantial amount of propaganda to use in their own strategic communication 
efforts. Therefore, it is vital that the United States refocus its policies and strategic 
communication efforts to regain the support of the Muslim populace so that it can better 
use the appropriate counterterrorism tools and capabilities at its disposal.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Perhaps the most immediate problem in this research is the following question: 
What is strategic communications, and what capabilities does it comprise? Part of the 
definitional issue is due to the fact that the term, strategic communications, is relatively 
new. It first appeared in the 2001 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Managed Information Dissemination as an evolution of the term public diplomacy. 
“Public diplomacy,” first used by U.S. Ambassador Edmund Guillion in 1965, is used to 
describe how governments use dialogue that is designed to inform and influence foreign 
citizens.2  
Looking to the U.S. government to help rectify this disconnect only leads to more 
confusion. The DOD defines strategic communication as the 
focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key 
audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the 
advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and 
objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, 
messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of 
national power.3 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 71–2. 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP1-02), 
266.  Last updated November 15, 2015. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf 
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The problem with the DOD definition lies in the fact that it views strategic 
communications as merely a process. Paul points out an important problem with the 
DOD’s process-only mentality. That is, no other government agency views strategic 
communications as only a process. Instead it is viewed as, or includes, a capability.4 
Therefore, the DOD, even if using the same definition as another agency, will conduct 
strategic communications differently.  
Meanwhile, the Department of State (DOS), the lead agency on strategic 
communications in the U.S. government, lacks an official definition—though the 2007 
National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication states that “public 
diplomacy and strategic communication should always strive to support our nation’s 
values and national security objectives.”5 The document then lists four requirements for 
all communication and diplomacy activities: “underscore our commitment to freedom, 
human rights and the dignity and equality of every human being; reach out to those who 
share our ideals; support those who struggle for freedom and democracy; counter those 
who espouse ideologies of hate and oppression.”6 However, this list is not a definition of 
strategic communications, but a playbook of actions that the DOS wishes to accomplish.  
The last major government definition comes from the President in the 2010 
National Framework for Strategic Communication: 
By “strategic communication(s)” we refer to: (a) the synchronization of 
words and deeds and how they will be perceived by selected audiences, as 
well as (b) programs and activities deliberately aimed at communicating 
and engaging with intended audiences, including those implemented by 
public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operations 
professionals.7 
 
                                                 
4 Paul, Strategic Communication, 21-2. 
5 Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee, U.S. National 
Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, June 2007, 2.  
6 Ibid. 
7 The White House, National Framework for Strategic Communication (Washington, DC, March 
2010), 2. 
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The problem with the White House’s definition is not in its content—the 
definition is similar in scope to the one provided by the DOD; it is in its tone. As Paul 
also points out, it does not come across as defining and directing the whole of 
government on how the United States will conduct strategic communications. Instead, the 
tone of the definition suggests that the White House is attempting to provide, internal to 
the document, clarification on what it believes strategic communication is. Failing to 
mandate a direct and clear definition for the whole of government, the White House’s 
definition appears only valid when discussing the term within the White House.8 
Lacking a common definition from which to begin makes it hard to communicate 
not only between U.S. government agencies but also with the foreign public which U.S. 
strategic communicators intend to influence. The confusion has been so great that in 
December 2012, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs George Little released 
a memo stating that the DOD was going to stop using the term strategic communications 
because it “actually added a layer of staffing and planning that blurred roles and functions 
of traditional staff elements and resulted in confusion and inefficiencies.”9 That is not to 
say that the DOD is now out of the strategic communication business; they just no longer 
utilize the term officially or place as much emphasis on the processes they had built up to 
conduct it in their version. Instead the DOD intends to focus on influencing others 
through its actions, not through messages crafted by strategic communication staff.10 
The research already shows that strategic communications is a vital element in 
conducting a successful counterterrorism plan, but what actions and capabilities make up 
the process? Again the field is rife with conflicting opinions. One side of the debate 
believes strategic communications is just about messaging; the other side believes that 
strategic communications is made up of all activities that communicate. The editors of 
Influence Warfare and academics like Phil Taylor argue that strategic communications is 
made up of “four pillars”: information operations (IO), psychological operations 
                                                 
8 Paul, Strategic Communication, 20-1. 
9 “Pentagon drops ‘strategic communication.’” USA Today. December 3, 2012. 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/03/pentagon-trims-strategic-
communication/1743485/. 
10 Ibid.  
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(PSYOPS), public diplomacy, and public affairs.11 Arguably these four actions along 
with a state’s values, culture, policies, and institutions make up what Joseph Nye calls 
“soft power,” which is the ability to have influence over others by co-opting them to 
share your values.12 “Hard power,” in contrast, uses the sticks and carrots of a state’s 
economic and military power to force or coerce others to follow your will.13 
The opposing camp argues that an organization’s actions are also important in 
crafting the message. Paul believes that strategic communications is composed of at least 
four basic elements. First, “informing, influencing, and persuading the public is 
important. Second, effectively informing, influencing, and persuading the public requires 
clear objectives from the state. Third, coordination and deconfliction are necessary to 
avoid information fratricide amongst state entities. Last, actions communicate,” as the 
uproar over the photos from Abu Ghraib showed.14  
The DOD definition mentions synchronizing both words and actions of all facets 
of the nation’s power, including not only all “soft power” capabilities but “hard power” 
as well. As Major Marshall Ecklund wrote, “policy actions ultimately speak louder than 
any words in a communication strategy, but both should be mutually supportive.”15 
Second, in this “war of ideas,” it is vital to understand that the enemy will make 
the most of every American misstep. As a consequence, for the United States to achieve 
its intended goals, it must better synchronize its words and actions. If the United States 
can formulate and execute its message better than Al Qaeda, it will go a long way in 
reducing Al Qaeda’s ability to sway the Muslim populace toward radicalism. But to do 
so, Washington needs to recognize what causes someone to radicalize and either become 
a terrorist or support Al Qaeda’s cause. If the United States cannot determine what drives 
                                                 
11 James J. F. Forest, and Frank Honkus, III, eds. Influence Warfare: How Terrorists and Governments 
Fight to Shape Perceptions in a War of Ideas, (Westport, CT: Pentagon Press, 2010), 7; Paul, Strategic 
Communication, 27. 
12 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 
31. 
13 Joseph Nye, Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 5. 
14 Paul, Strategic Communication, 4.  
15 Ibid. 
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the enemy and its supporters, it is bound to make policy decisions and statements that 
help the enemy formulate its own strategic communications plan. 
Finally, understanding the importance of strategic communications and the 
radicalization process will allow the United States to determine if it should continue its 
muscular projection of hard-power primacy in its counterterrorist strategy. Although U.S. 
counterterrorism strategies have toned down some of the kill-and-destroy rhetoric since 
the first strategy was released in 2003, the increased use of drone strikes to kill suspected 
terrorists even after the drawdown of military operations in the region plays into Al 
Qaeda’s message of Western imperialism. Opinion polls conducted by Pew suggest that 
U.S. favorability in Muslim nations has been negatively affected by its hard-power 
actions since 9/11, as the populations in such important allies as Turkey, Jordan, and 
Egypt have seen U.S. favorability drop from highs of 52 percent, 25 percent, and 30 
percent between 2000 and 2006 to 15 percent, 12 percent, and 19 percent, respectively, in 
2012.16 It is true that these same highly controversial actions have been responsible for 
capturing or killing most of Al Qaeda’s leadership and militant supporters. But as former 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once asked, “[A]re we capturing, killing or 
deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical 
clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?”17 So far it seems the enemy is 
arguably producing more fighters and supporters than the United States can kill or 
capture—in no small part because of the failure of its strategic communication policies. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In his book Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates, 
Christopher Paul attempts to unify not only the broad government definitions but aspects 
and definitions from the private sector as well, to come up with what he views as a more 
complete definition. Paul believes that strategic communication is the “coordinated 
actions, messages, images, and other forms of signaling or engagement intended to 
                                                 
16 Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, October 27, 2013, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/chapter-1-views-of-the-u-s-and-american-foreign-policy-4/.  
17 “Rumsfeld’s war-on-terror memo,” USA Today, May 20, 2005, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm. 
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inform, influence, or persuade selected audiences in support of national objectives.”18 
This thesis utilizes Paul’s definition because, unlike those offered by the U.S. 
government, Paul’s definition revolves around four core elements necessary for effective 
strategic communications. First, “informing, influencing, and persuading is important. 
Second, effectively informing, influencing, and persuading requires clear objectives. 
Third, coordination and deconfliction are necessary to avoid information fratricide. Last, 
actions communicate.”19 While the DOD’s definition comes closest to Paul’s, it lacks a 
defined core of principles by which to operate, which may explain why the DOD stopped 
using the term altogether in 2012. 
Whatever the definition, many scholars acknowledge that a successfully 
implemented strategic communications plan will aid in gaining the public’s trust of the 
organization conducting the effort—domestically as well as internationally.20 In a fight 
against violent extremists, gaining the trust of the public is vital, and in the fight against 
radical Islamists, the public includes both American and foreign audiences. Bruce 
Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw argue that point in their work A Strategic 
Framework for Countering Terrorism. Two of their four crucial elements of a successful 
counterterrorist campaign are first, “‘legitimizing measures’ must be taken by the 
government to build public trust and support, combined with anti-terrorist legislation 
sensitive to public sentiments” and second, a requirement for “collaboration among 
governments and security forces of different countries.”21 Accomplishing both of these 
tasks requires a state to have an effective strategic communication plan that incorporates 
Paul’s core principles. 
The enemy has realized the importance of strategic communications as well, as 
Thomas Hammes has observed: “Insurgent campaigns have shifted from military 
campaigns supported by information operations to strategic communications supported 
                                                 
18 Paul, Strategic Communication, 3. 
19 Ibid., 4. 
20 Ibid., 9; James J. F. Forest and Frank Honkus, III, “Introduction,” Influence Warfare, ed. James J. F. 
Forest (Westport: Praeger, 2010), 1. 
21 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism 
(Santa Monica: Rand, 1992), 9, 10. 
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by guerrilla and terrorist operations.”22 If the enemy has realized the importance of 
strategic communications and the need to refocus on soft power over hard power to sway 
supporters, then the U.S. government may want to take note.  
1. Radicalization 
After a decade of battling violent extremists, Americans are beginning to 
understand that more can be done to stop the recruitment of new terrorists.23 As such, 
policymakers and operators alike need a better understanding of how and why someone 
radicalizes. Early research in the field mainly focused on the psychology of terrorists, 
with scholars such as Jerrold Post, John Crayton, and Frederick Hacker arguing that 
terrorism was the result of psychological and behavioral deviance.24 This viewpoint 
began to fall out of favor in the 1980s and 1990s due to a lack of any empirical data 
backing many of the claims.  
Additionally, following extensive interviewing by himself and others, John 
Horgan concludes in The Psychology of Terrorism, 2005, that the required characteristics 
of terrorist leaders and members were opposite of the traits generally found in 
psychopathic individuals.25 Whereas a psychotic killer’s reasons for his actions are 
“personal, fuelled [sic] and maintained by their elaborate fantasies,” terrorists are 
typically driven by motives independent of their particular victims.26 Donatella della 
Porta also notes that research has shown there is no specific personality trait “typical” of 
terrorists, and that terrorists are impelled to engage in destructive acts for a variety of 
                                                 
22 James J. F. Forest, “Introduction,” 1. 
23 “Rumsfeld’s war-on-terror memo,” USA Today; Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent 
Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” Journal of Strategic Study 4, no. 4 (2011); Paul, 
Strategic Communication, 1. 
24 J. W. Crayton, “Terrorism and Psychology of the Self,” in Perspectives on Terrorism, edited by L. 
Z. Freedman, & Y. Alexander, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1983), 33–41; F.J. Hacker, 
Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Time, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976); J. M. 
Post, “Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior,” Terrorism 13, no. 1 (1990), 241–256. 
25 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, (London: Routledge, 2005), 51. 
26 Ibid. 
 10 
reasons.27 She also points out that past research has shown that there is no typical pattern 
in terrorists’ family socialization being the cause of radicalization either, countering the 
idea that a dysfunctional or abusive upbringing was a sure path to radicalization.28  
Instead, research on radicalization has progressed along what is now called 
“push” and “pull” factors first described by Martha Crenshaw in her often cited work, 
“The Causes of Terrorism,” 1981, as preconditions and precipitants of radicalization. 
Preconditions or “push” factors “set the stage for terrorism,” such as lack of democracy 
or civil liberties, experiences of discrimination, and repression by foreign occupation, or 
what Crenshaw called enabling or permissive factors.29  Precipitants or “pull” factors are 
forces that appeal to the individual from outside sources, typically from propaganda or 
perceived assaults on a group, such as contested elections, police brutality, and even 
peace talks. Crenshaw states these two factors are compounded by modernization, where 
sophisticated networks of transportation and communication favor the emergence of 
terrorism.30  
Still, no clear consensus prevails among scholars on the motivations of an 
individual who radicalizes. Karen Keys-Turner summarizes the various model types as 
global, situational, social, and psychological or behavioral motivators and factors, but 
points out that most of the models and theories lack a synthesis of multiple disciplines 
and factors.31 Crenshaw agrees with that assessment and also warns that “terrorists 
cannot be considered in isolation from their social and political context,” because 
radicalization may occur either as a group process or individually, so no one process can 
adequately explain how someone radicalizes.32  
                                                 
27 Donatella della Porta, “Introduction: On Individual Motivations In Underground Political 
Organizations,” in Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations, ed. D. 
Donatella (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1992), 7. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (Jul, 1981), 381. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Karen D. Keys-Turner, The Violent Islamic Radicalization Process: A Framework For 
Understanding (Monterey. CA: NPS, 2011). 
32 Martha Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,” Political 
Psychology 21, no. 2 (Jun, 2000), 418. 
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Although there is no single theory that can explain the radicalization process, 
many psychologists and social scientists have viewed similar markers or stages in the 
radicalization process that motivate extremists. Crenshaw suggests that “the opportunity 
for action, the need to belong, the desire for social status, and the acquisition of material 
reward” are common motivators for radicals and terrorists;33 whereas Dr. Randy Borum 
points to perceived injustices, the need for identity, and the need to belong as the 
common vulnerabilities and perceptions shared among many radicals and terrorists.34 
Even though both scholars identify similar markers in the radicalization process, it must 
be pointed out that not everyone who holds or shares these vulnerabilities or perceptions 
becomes a terrorist.35 Yet as Fergal Keane and the U.S. Army point out, even those 
radicals that do not become active terrorists can assist in the actions and success of a 
terrorist organization by becoming active or passive supporters.36 Understanding what 
can drive someone to radicalize, or to support those who do, provides the state the 
opportunity to address and attempt to reduce those motivators. 
Successful terrorist groups understand this dynamic and actively recruit in areas 
where the perception of injustice is high by utilizing social networks and interpersonal 
relationships to impart a sense of urgency and need for action. The terrorist organization 
increases the number of active and sympathetic members, which increases the group’s 
financial, political, and popular support enabling the group to conduct and sustain their 
operations. Therefore, by reducing the radicalization process, Borum concludes that this 
will reduce the capability and effectiveness of terrorist organizations’ operations and 
longevity.37  
                                                 
33 Martha Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” Orbis 29, 
no. 3 (Fall 1985), 466. 
34 Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism (Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 2004), 29. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid.; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-
First Century, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army, 2007). 
37 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 29. 
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2. Hard Power versus Soft Power 
The debate between hard- and soft-power advocates rarely devolves into an all-or-
nothing discussion. Advocates on both sides of the issue realize the benefits and utility of 
elements of both hard and soft power in fighting violent extremists and their supporters. 
The differences in opinion revolve around which aspect of national power should be at 
the forefront in what the Bush administration called the “war of ideas.”  
Many hard-power advocates, especially in the Bush administration, insisted—and 
continue to insist—that the world faces a newer and deadlier form of terrorism, one that 
sought the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Therefore, the 
tactics of the past no longer sufficed to defeat the enemy. Instead they stated that “the 
United States, with its unique ability to build partnerships and project power, will lead the 
fight against terrorist organizations of global reach. By striking constantly and ensuring 
that terrorists have no place to hide, we will compress their scope and reduce the 
capability of these organizations.”38  
Although the Bush administration also promoted spreading democracy to the 
Middle East and greatly increased the use of economic aid and incentives in the hopes of 
helping the United States to “win the war of ideas and diminish the underlying conditions 
that promote the despair and the destructive visions of political change that lead people to 
embrace, rather than shun, terrorism,” it was the “with us or against us” philosophy 
leading up to and during the invasion of Iraq that cemented the perceived hard power first 
strategy of the United States in the region and around the world.39 Although there was 
anticipation for a change in U.S. hard power philosophy with the election of President 
Barack Obama, the end of the Iraq War, and the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan, the 
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U.S.’s increased use of unmanned drone strikes to target terrorists has continued to erode 
U.S. support in the region.40 
However, the Bush administration was not alone in recommending a hard-power-
first philosophy in fighting terrorism. Michael Scheurer, the former head of the CIA unit 
charged with tracking Osama bin Laden, notes that based on the unchanging U.S. foreign 
policy in the Muslim world, the only recourse would be military force along the scale of 
World War II, fast-paced and with large body counts.41 Scheurer also rejects relying on 
our allies for help, because according to him, they will not do the “dirty work” for us.42 
Yet another proponent of hard power, but with the assistance of diplomacy, is Benjamin 
Netanyahu, the current Prime Minister of Israel, who also advocates strong economic 
sanctions against terrorist-sponsoring states, as well as actively pursuing terrorists 
wherever they go, among other tactics.43  
Yet not one of his ten recommendations looks to solve the rudimentary cause(s) 
of the terrorist actions, and he, like the Bush administration’s 2003 National Strategy, 
lays the blame of international terrorism at the feet of state sponsorship.44 Hard-power 
advocates, however, failed to realize that Al Qaeda, like other successful terrorist groups, 
was well mobilized and enjoyed both active and passive support among a widespread 
group of Muslim constituencies, making them very resistant to the decapitation strategy 
being pushed by the United States and its allies.45 
Soft-power advocates such as Rik Coolsaet, Christopher Paul, Paul Pillar, Audrey 
Cronin, and Robert Gates all note that focusing on hard-power techniques (especially in 
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the invasion of Iraq) instead of promoting the old ‘classic’ methods of counterterrorism 
actually gave Al Qaeda renewed vigor and support from many in the Muslim world.46 
Pillar notes that military retaliation after a terrorist strike is usually motivated by a desire 
to “do something,” instead of a belief that a particular action will actually reduce future 
terrorism. But he strongly advises against an overt preemptive and even reactive use of 
military forces against terrorists, as history has shown that in many cases both the 
physical and nonphysical effects of the attack are detrimental to the attacking nation.47  
Cronin argues that the West must realize that Al Qaeda will not achieve its goals, 
and that continued military force to crush it and attempts to decapitate its leadership will 
also fail. The organization will merely continue to evolve and the hatred bred by the 
West’s actions will continue to fill it with willing volunteers. In Cronin’s opinion, the 
United States must stop treating Al Qaeda as an existential threat, and “accept some level 
of risk and resist being provoked into ill-considered policies that accelerate the movement 
and are destabilizing.”48 Paul and Gates also refute the primacy of the capture or kill 
policy advocated by individuals such as Daniel Byman, because they contest that if you 
do not attack the perceptions and motivations that drive the terrorists and their supporters 
in the first place, the organization and network will simply reconstitute itself as Al Qaeda 
has done.49  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
To review, this chapter introduced the problems that the United States has faced 
since 9/11 in implementing a viable and effective dialogue with citizens of U.S. allies and 
Muslim nations. Next, Chapter II discusses strategic communications, what it is, useful 
tools necessary to conduct it, and why it is important in the fight against violent 
extremists. In Chapter III, this paper analyzes the U.S. efforts during the Cold War, 
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Vietnam War, and the “surge” of the Iraq War as a reference of successful and 
unsuccessful implementations of strategic communications in waging and winning a “war 
of hearts and minds.” Chapter IV discusses the radicalization process, because it is 
important to understand why and how someone becomes radicalized so that proper 
policies and antiterrorist tools can be implemented to minimize and defeat the threat. 
Finally, Chapter V provides recommendations to improve U.S. strategic communications 
policies that will be more effective in defeating the current enemy. 
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II. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 
In the war against Al Qaeda, IS, and other extremist organizations, the ability to 
communicate ideas and promote positive perceptions to other states and their citizens is 
at the tactical forefront.50 If the United States is to properly wage what has been termed 
the “war of ideas,” then an effective transmission of its national strategy to the world may 
aide in that endeavor. 
Four capabilities are repeatedly cited as the core elements of strategic 
communication. They are information operations, psychological operations, public 
affairs, and public diplomacy. Information operations is a relatively new term that 
evolved from command and control warfare in the late 1990s. IO is a DOD-specific 
function in strategic communication and is defined as “the integrated employment, during 
military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of 
operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and 
potential adversaries while protecting our own.”51 This new definition changed the old 
definition by eliminating a focus on a select group of military capabilities by utilizing the 
term “information-related” to broaden the scope of what IO is responsible for, noting that 
“as the strategic environment continues to change, so does IO.”52  
When used effectively, IO allows a military commander to use and influence 
information of all varieties to inform, influence, or persuade the perceptions and attitudes 
of the target audience in the information environment, which is the “aggregate of 
individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on 
information.”53 At its core, IO is the epitome of soft power utilizing, but not owning, the 
following capabilities as a force multiplier to meet the military commander’s desired 
effect: “joint interagency coordination groups, public affairs, civil-military operations, 
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cyberspace operations, information assurance, space operations, military information 
support operations, intelligence, military deception, operations security, special technical 
operations, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations, and key leader engagements.”54 
Psychological operations are a subset of IO conducted primarily by the U.S. 
military as well as select intelligence agencies to affect foreign audiences. The DOD 
defines PSYOPS as “planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to 
foreign audiences to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately 
the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.”55 The 
intended goal of PSYOPS is to influence or reinforce foreign behavior so that it is 
favorable to the U.S.’s military and/or political objectives. Knowing that, policymakers 
should realize that every action has psychological implications that may be leveraged in 
the battle to influence a foreign target audience.  
When PSYOPS are properly employed, they can help save the lives of friendly 
forces by reducing the enemy forces’ morale and efficiency. They can also discourage or 
reduce “aggressive actions and create dissidence and disaffection” within the enemies’ 
military and civilian populace, with the intended goal of inducing surrender.56  
The U.S. government currently conducts PSYOPS at three levels: strategic, 
operational, and tactical. Strategic-level PSYOPS are handled at the international level by 
U.S. agencies to positively persuade foreign mindsets and actions toward U.S. objectives. 
Strategic-level missions are typically conducted within the civilian arena, but DOD 
personnel and assets may be used. Operational-level PSYOPS missions are designed by 
doctrine to strengthen the United States’ capability “to conduct military operations in the 
operational area and other missions across the range of military operations.”57 Tactical-
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level PSYOPS are conducted on a small scale by tactical commanders to support 
immediate or near term operations against the enemy.58 
At each level, PSYOPS employ various mediums such as radio, social media, 
print media, television, and leaflet drops on adversarial territory, which have only been 
enhanced by the expansion of mass communications capabilities in the modern world. 
However, the effectiveness of these various communication methods is dependent on the 
enemies’ opinion of the United States’ ability to execute its promises or actions.59 
Where PSYOPS are conducted to influence foreign audiences, public affairs are 
conducted to inform and communicate with both foreign and domestic audiences. It is 
important to note that to maintain the credibility of military public affairs, PSYOPS and 
public affairs operations should be planed separately even though they can reinforce each 
other and also involve close collaboration and coordination in their planning phases.60 To 
ensure the separation, the DOD has directed that public affairs may not be used in any 
military deception or any other disinformation campaign, nor can any propaganda 
designed to sway or influence domestic or foreign public opinion be used in DOD public 
affairs programs.61 The DOD conducts public affairs “through the responsive release of 
accurate information and imagery to domestic and international audiences, public affairs 
puts operational actions in context, facilitates the development of informed perceptions 
about military operations, helps undermine adversarial propaganda efforts, and 
contributes to the achievement of national, strategic, and operational objectives.”62  
Unlike IO and PSYOPS, however, public affairs is conducted by all aspects of the 
U.S. government, with the DOS providing overall direction, coordination, and 
supervision of all the U.S. government’s overseas activities. The Bureau of Public Affairs 
in the DOS is responsible for engaging both “domestic and international media to 
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communicate timely and accurate information” as well as to coordinate and help with 
other government agencies’ foreign public affairs. Its mission is to help communicate and 
educate audiences on U.S. foreign policy and national security interests and help spread 
American values abroad.63 In support of furthering U.S. national strategic policy, the 
DOD, the DOS, and other government agencies use a wide variety of methods and 
sources to distribute their information. These include news releases, social media, 
regional media hubs, public announcements, press briefings, government websites, 
community relations, audio-visual products, speaking tours, and town-hall meetings.64  
Public diplomacy differs from public affairs in that public affairs deals mainly 
with the press and tends to be short-term, reactive, and informative, while public 
diplomacy is pro-active and tries to influence and persuade the attitudes of the targeted 
audience. In that sense, public diplomacy is closer to PSYOPS in action, but like public 
affairs, in that it requires a whole-of-government, and in certain cases, a whole-of-society 
approach to carry it out. It also differs from traditional diplomacy in that it focuses on 
building relationships with foreign citizens instead of governments. Another difference is 
that to effectively implement public diplomacy, there must be a long-term plan and 
commitment. Unlike the other three strategic communication tools discussed, public 
diplomacy is based on building relationships that require trust and consistency from both 
sides of the engagement.65 
Once run by the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War, public 
diplomacy is now predominately carried out and coordinated by the DOS. The DOS 
states that the mission of public diplomacy “is to support the achievement of U.S. foreign 
policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by 
informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the 
relationship between the people and Government of the United States and citizens of the 
                                                 
63 U.S. Department of State, “Bureau of Public Affairs,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/. 
64 Ibid.; Joint Chiefs, Public Affairs.  
65 Hiram Henderson, “US Public Diplomacy: Waiting for the War of Ideas,” in IO Sphere, Fall 2008, 
date accessed September 12, 2013, http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere.htm; James J. F. Forest 
“Introduction,” in Influence Warfare, 8. 
 21 
rest of the world.”66 The DOS and its partner agencies carry out this mission utilizing 
three basic instruments. First, they use international information activities, which are a 
mix of traditional public affairs products and services designed to inform, influence, or 
persuade foreign audiences with a localized perspective of U.S. messages. Second, 
education and cultural exchanges with foreign academic, professional, and military 
personnel designed to build personal and institutional relationships between U.S. and 
foreign citizens are utilized. The last instrument, international broadcasting, utilizes a 
mixture of independently-managed and operated radio, satellite television, and Internet 
services to promote an open dialogue of information and ideas throughout the world.67 
Although public diplomacy is a whole-of-government approach, the majority of 
its efforts are carried out by the White House, DOS, DOD, Broadcasting Board of 
Governors (BBG), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The 
government is also assisted in this endeavor by numerous private sector corporations, 
non-governmental organizations, and individuals. After the passage of the Foreign 
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, the DOS inherited most of the functions 
and responsibilities of the USIA for conducting public diplomacy. Now the lead federal 
agency for the process, the DOS coordinates and conducts all public diplomacy efforts 
through the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The Under 
Secretary is assisted in this sector by four bureaus and offices: the Bureaus of 
International Information Programs, Educational and Cultural Affairs, Public Affairs, and 
the Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. 
This new framework allows the DOS to blend its original foreign policy oversight with 
public diplomacy utilizing the first two instruments of public diplomacy. The BBG 
assists the DOS with the third instrument, international broadcasting, as the BBG 
inherited the oversight of all non-military international U.S. broadcasting responsibilities 
from the USIA. The DOD aides in the public diplomacy front by conducting theater 
security engagements, including military-to-military training exercises, U.S. Navy port 
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calls, military exchange programs, and humanitarian and disaster relief operations. The 
USAID assists the process by coordinating and conducting foreign assistance programs 
that aim to improve foreign nations’ agricultural, social, health, economic, and 
government sectors.68  
Although the four tools discussed make up the core elements of strategic 
communication, if they are not effectively combined with the state’s other soft and hard 
power elements, the strategic communication effort can be counterproductive. In the war 
against Al Qaeda, managing perceptions has become a vital effort, one that requires a 
concerted effort to harness U.S. “smart power.”  
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III. HISTORICAL WARS  
There are various historical wars that offer insight into strategic communication 
and how to deal with failures of the present practices. The Cold War, the Vietnam War, 
and the Iraq War offer very important insights into the practice of strategic 
communication. Insights into use of propaganda, public policy on waging war, and use of 
local forces in highlighting the atrocities and intentions of terrorist groups or insurgents 
are important descriptions and sources of information. This chapter reviews this 
experience.  
A. THE COLD WAR 
The Cold War was a four-decade-long ideological battle between the United 
States and the former Soviet Union and their respective allies. The United States and its 
Western allies developed and executed a plan of containment first proposed by George 
Kennan in his “long telegram” message and later ratified by President Truman signing 
the National Security Council (NSC) Paper 68 (NSC-68). The West’s containment 
strategy combined the hard power elements of military deterrence with the soft power 
tools of public diplomacy, psychological warfare, open media, cultural influence, and the 
economic advantages provided by its capitalist societies.69  
This approach was in direct contrast to the Soviets whose strategy was the spread 
of the communist ideology through state-controlled media propaganda, economic and 
military aid to socialist path states, and the use of military force to maintain coercion, as 
was seen in Korea, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. Nye summed up the Cold 
War as four decades of the West containing the Soviet Union as the United States ate 
away at the U.S.S.R.’s “self-confidence with broadcasts, student and cultural exchanges, 
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and the success of capitalist economics.”70 The U.S. strategic communication efforts 
during the Cold War, according to Nye, were the epitome of smart power, effectively 
combining both elements of U.S. soft and hard power tools to meet the state’s strategic 
objectives.71 
The effectiveness of U.S. strategic communication during the Cold War had much 
to do with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the Smith-Mundt Act of 
1948, and NSC-68. The National Security Act greatly restructured the U.S. military 
bureaucracy, as it brought all individual services under the leadership of the newly 
created Secretary of Defense, created the National Security Council, and reinstated the 
old World War II Office of Strategic Services and renamed it the Central Intelligence 
Agency. This act had the long-term effect of uniting the formerly disjointed military 
services under the leadership of one department, creating the backbone of the future U.S. 
foreign policy decision-making apparatus in the NSC, and establishing the CIA, an 
organization that was tasked with conducting the covert and psychological operations that 
became prevalent in the Cold War era.  
Congress passed the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948, which legalized and formalized 
the use of public diplomacy, propaganda, and communication strategies to influence 
foreign audiences. This act was the basis of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s creation 
of the USIA in 1953, bringing all aspects of public diplomacy within the responsibility of 
one organization under the executive branch. Until its dissolution in 1999, the USIA was 
responsible for promoting the United States’ national interests by increasing the dialogue 
between Americans, U.S. institutions and their foreign counterparts through 
understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics. Key instruments of this 
dialogue were organizations such as Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Voice of 
America, and the various student and cultural exchange programs between the U.S. and 
foreign nations, including Soviet Bloc countries.72 
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The strong backing of U.S. strategic communication programs received by the 
Harry S. Truman and Eisenhower administrations was continued by President John F. 
Kennedy. President Kennedy appointed well-known journalist Edward R. Murrow as the 
director of the USIA, provided him direct access to the Oval Office, and allowed him a 
seat on the NSC, giving the public diplomacy mission greater importance in U.S. foreign 
policy decisions. President Kennedy also created the Peace Corps and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development, which provided both American volunteers and money to 
assist developing nations. Another area that received increased focus was in the creation 
and development of U.S. military Special Forces. These units combined aspects of both 
hard and soft power and gave the U.S. greater flexibility to counter communist threats in 
developing countries utilizing guerrilla warfare.73 
Although the United States had many early successes with its strategic 
communication plan, there were failures as well. The U.S. response to the Hungarian 
Revolution in 1956, the shoot-down of the U.S. U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union, and 
the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion led U.S. policymakers to stop what were deemed as 
aggressive and provocative measures. Instead, policymakers pushed for a lower-key and 
longer-range strategy that focused on winning the Cold War by utilizing greater cultural 
and economic influence, with the assistance of informational programs to emphasize the 
greater benefits associated with the American way of life. The U.S. strategic 
communication plan also suffered the negative effects of the U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam, as well as the détente policies under President Richard Nixon, which placed 
more emphasis on traditional diplomacy to reduce the classical confrontational Cold War 
propaganda. Détente also led the United States to stop openly opposing Communism and 
the legitimacy of the Soviet Union.74 
President Jimmy Carter began to reinvigorate U.S. strategic communication to 
counter the Soviet Union by focusing on the U.S. defense of human rights and individual 
liberties to contrast against the Soviet’s military aggression. But as the Soviet Union 
continued to rebuild its armed forces amid the easing of the U.S. pressure during détente 
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and fund insurgencies and terrorism around the world, it was evident that a stronger effort 
was required.  
President Ronald Reagan, following the footsteps of Presidents Eisenhower and 
Kennedy, understood the importance of strategic communication in carrying out national 
objectives. He placed renewed emphasis on PSYOPS and public diplomacy in 
conjunction with ending détente policies by embarking on a large military buildup. 
President Reagan also increased the resources available to the United States’ strategic 
communication organizations with orders to reengage the Soviet Union. The USIA was 
assisted in this endeavor by modernizing its capabilities to take advantage of the 
increased ownership of televisions throughout the world and the reciprocity agreed upon 
by President Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, where a series of exchanges 
between the two leaders were aired in the United States and the Soviet Union. Gorbachev 
also stopped the jamming of USIA and other foreign broadcasts inside the Soviet Union, 
allowing greater access to information for citizens of the Eastern Bloc countries. 
President Reagan’s increased economic, cultural, and political pressure utilizing all of the 
U.S. strategic communication tools, in conjunction with decades of erosion of the Soviet 
system in the hands of cultural exchanges, accelerated the demise of the old Soviet 
Union.75 As Carnes Lord and Helle C. Dale surmised: “in the end, ideas made a 
difference” in ending the four-decade-long Cold War.76 
In the era of the Cold War, propaganda spread in the United States confirmed that 
the enemies of the country were legitimate, justified, and genuine. The potential of 
psychological warfare was undisputed in the wake of technological advancement and 
realization of the importance of IO in war. Organization of the American people was 
deemed as important as the strategic planning required for troops in the war. The CIA and 
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the USIA were mandated to integrate other mechanisms in influencing friendly countries, 
alienating enemies, and wooing neutrals in the Cold War.77 
The reasoning behind using propaganda was identical to what had been applied in 
previous total wars. The only difference is that in the Cold War there was a strong aspect 
of public opinion in policy making. Policymakers formulated strategies to woo the 
support of the public for various warfare policies. The psychological strategy sought to 
influence beliefs, thoughts, actions, and perception of home and the outside population.78  
A distinct change was made in the era of the Cold War by U.S. authorities 
regarding differentiating between information and propaganda. Objective transformation 
of facts was evident from the onset, and this ensured that containment policies succeeded. 
Information that was being passed was customized for different target populations that 
included local and foreign communities. Objective transformation during the Cold War 
was used to skillfully encourage other countries into alliances. Success from the 
application of strategic communication was realized as a containment strategy and the 
inclusion of cultural vigor served to enhance collaboration between hard and soft 
powers.79  
B. THE VIETNAM WAR 
The Vietnam War occurred from November 1955 to 1975, as a proxy war during 
the Cold War. The U.S. policy in Vietnam came under scrutiny during the war in 1968 
when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met to respond to strategic narrative 
applied by the United States. The Viet Cong’s effectiveness in launching an offensive 
operation against the United States was another reason for the Senate meeting.  
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It was important for the country to understand what was going on, according to 
Senator Albert Gore Sr. of Tennessee. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had escalated and 
thousands of young men had died or were crippled for life.80 The senator indicated that 
prestige and moral position had been lost and predicted that consequences would be 
considerable. Though there were certain liberties that were taken with intelligence in the 
Tonkin incident, there was skepticism and Senator Fulbright asked for the U.S. 
population to be informed of what was going on in the Vietnam War.81  
In the course of the Vietnam War, new stories cropped up from time to time as 
PSYOPS were diverted from the traditional battlefield to the modern information 
environment. There had been suggestions that the propaganda war in Vietnam had to be 
fought on a domestic front and not in the theater. Kennedy’s administration was very 
successful in the management of domestic flow of information. Public knowledge about 
the casualties in Vietnam was limited, but as the death toll began to rise, the information 
control strategy started fading. From 1963 to 1968, the United States’ purpose in Vietnam 
was not certain as policymakers struggled to stimulate Kennedy’s vision after his 
assassination.82  
Now President, Lyndon B. Johnson had a strategy that was aimed at pursuing 
incremental levels of military buildup that masked the fact that major combat operations 
were occurring. During Johnson’s presidency, public diplomacy and other kinds of 
domestic propaganda became more prominent. There was a lot of secrecy in formulation 
and implementation of Vietnam policy. The public was not informed about most of the 
policies and war was waged quietly. All of these secret strategies were aimed at 
preventing probable dissension and losing public support due to war hysteria in order to 
protect Johnson’s Great Society Programs.83  
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A disaster in wartime strategy was realized when quiet waging of the war plan 
was implemented. Neither Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s proclivity for numbers 
nor Johnson’s preferred approach brought much to the task of preventing the expansion 
of communists in Vietnam—certainly not in the minds of the domestic audiences in the 
United States and its allies. The Johnson government did not portray the Vietnamese and 
the Viet Cong as enemies for their act of killing young American men. Instead, the 
strategic communications battle was controlled by North Vietnam while the United States 
continued to waste its resources and manpower on fighting insurgents who utilized 
strategic communications in influencing the local population to support them. New cadres 
were inserted to keep guerilla efforts active as insurgents built regular forces in their 
sanctuary. Moreover, the U.S. forces ignored the efforts of the Viet Cong on the 
information front and failed to analyze the operations of North Vietnam. Instead, the 
United States particularly focused on eliminating the insurgents. However, the efforts of 
the United States’ soldiers failed due to poor application of strategic communications.84 
The Vietnam War and the strategic communication about it were both revealed as 
failures with the 1971 publication of the so-called Pentagon Papers, which proved the 
DOD’s plan to use propaganda to assuage Americans about the critical situation of the 
Vietnam War. Daniel Ellsberg, a high-level official who had opposed the decision to 
fudge the state of the war, ultimately leaked the report to The New York Times, which 
published the document amid increasing public skepticism about U.S. aims and action in 
Vietnam. Taken from the papers, the National Security Action Memorandum was 
perceived as the pivotal document that marked President Johnson’s acceptance of 
offensive ground combat operations in Vietnam. However, the president in 1965 had 
denied having knowledge of any strategies in Vietnam that were being promulgated by 
the United States.85  
Meanwhile, additional troops were being dispatched and casualties mounted 
significantly—to no obvious strategic gain for the U.S. side. A credibility gap was 
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created by the lack of results and keeping the public in the dark about the Vietnam War, 
and by the time Nixon came into control any government information project was met 
with distrust, if not open opposition, from the American public.86  
C. IRAQ, DECEMBER 2007 TO FEBRUARY 2009 
There are various case studies in which the United States achieved success in the 
application of strategic communications in war or security operations. Following the 
Vietnam War, there was the war in Iraq, and of particular interest the period between 
December 2007 and February 2009. According to the Pentagon, the political situation in 
Iraq had led to the deterioration of security. With the so-called surge of forces ordered in 
January 2007 by President George W. Bush, five brigades were deployed, and there was 
a significant improvement in security in Iraq by Fall 2007. However, there was a strong 
information environment that was being utilized by the insurgents as they continued to 
dominate information operations in the region. This was despite the enormous amounts of 
financial and technological resources possessed by the brigades from the United States.87  
Strategic communications by the U.S. government were applied in trying to avert 
the impending deadly terror attacks as many civilians had already been killed in the war. 
IO of the insurgents was paralleled by campaigns and involvement of the international 
media and devised by experts. Propaganda campaigns were aimed at modeling moderates 
among the public and improving passive support of the U.S. forces.88  
One principal coalition in Iraq was Multi-National Division—Baghdad (MND-B). 
The commander of this division was Major General Jeffrey Hamond, and he regularly 
emphasized IO for the military operation in Iraq. Targeting meetings that were held by 
the G-7 Department, there were briefings for all IO support for every operation by U.S. 
forces. Major General Jeffrey Hamond started an offensive and aggressive campaign and 
application of strategic communication to quell the superiority of the insurgents on the 
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information front. The offensive commenced in December 2007 and served to break the 
grip the insurgents had on the local population.89  
Twelve billets that had been allocated to G-7 IO were tripled after they were 
deemed insufficient. There were more IO specialists as battalions and brigades were 
increased. G-2 (Intelligence) and G-7 intelligence operations were in close cooperation to 
improve IO and allow more integration of resources. It is from this cooperation that the 
United States was able to access background information aimed at enhancing 
psychological warfare operations. Use of psychological warfare operations was a scheme 
in strategic communications that aided in modeling of efficient methods of developing 
moderates among the population in Iraq.90  
Detailed information about the audience of IO was sufficient for specialists to 
model various strategies to garner support for the U.S. operations in Iraq. Through 
intelligence reports, the strengths and weaknesses of particular IO were identified early 
enough, and necessary changes made in time. Varying levels of sensitivity of the target 
groups was information that was readily availed by intelligence operations in the region 
and used in devising customized strategies for different groups. Before the collaboration 
between the United States and other G-7 members, IO were misguided and targeted to a 
mixed population. The IO resources were also limited, and their utilization was 
fragmented. After the collaboration and realization of the importance of IO by Major 
General Jeffrey Hamond, unsatisfactory results were reversed through improvement of 
intensity and prevention of dilution of messages.91  
Major General Jeffrey Hamond saw to change the ‘floodlight approach’ to a 
‘spotlight approach’ with more specific target populations for customized IO strategies. 
The illumination involved a well-defined area that was targeted for intensive IO. The 
spotlight was then moved to another area and executed. During this war, the IO was 
centralized with coordination of resources and operations emanating from the Divisions 
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headquarters. The brigades planned and executed the spotlight approach in tactical areas 
of interest (TAI) that were designated.92  
After the institutionalization of the spotlight approach, the information 
environment was dominated by MND-B. The spotlight approach was successful through 
concentrated and continuous operations that made sure that insurgents were 
“outshouted.” One of the most important tasks of the MND-B was to communicate with 
the Iraqi population and information on potential threats was, therefore, important to 
achieve this objective.93  
Information on identified risks and imminent threats was distributed to the local 
population through leaflets and handbills. The information served to inform the locals 
about the threat of insurgents and develop moderates regarding the operation by the 
United States. Leaflets were later distributed by Iraqi soldiers and policemen leading to 
an improvement of the opinion toward foreign security forces and the reigning 
government. The presence of soldiers from Iraq among the security forces and their use 
in the distribution of the leaflets enhanced perceived credibility by the local population. 
The first spotlight IO plan was executed to destroy Al Qaeda cells, and IO messages used 
in this operation were aimed at leveraging opinion about Al Qaeda among the populace. 
Loudspeakers, handbills, and posters were used to deliver the intended messages with 
detailed information on Al Qaeda crimes. This operation was instrumental in validating 
the spotlight approach and made the TAI a zone in which insurgents had no say.94  
In an operation to regain control of the Thawra district, MND-B dedicated all its 
strategic communication resources so that operation and information dominance was 
quickly achieved. Messages used in the Thawra operation passed information about the 
legitimacy of government and operation of security forces. At the same time, Al Qaeda 
group operations were demonized. Involvement of U.S. strategic specialists in major 
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economic, social, and political business served to sufficiently inform the residents about 
the intentions of security forces and the reigning government.95  
From intelligence reports during the war, the distribution of handbills, leaflets, 
and posters and the use of local security forces in IO greatly affected the opinion of the 
local population. Their opinion was gradually changed from supporting the activities of 
the militia to seeing signs of stability and security from U.S. security operations. 
Additionally, billboards were erected to push further on the IO and the residents began 
observing the results of the operation.96  
The success of strategic communication was based on residents changing their 
opinions about the operation by U.S. and coalition forces. Messages from the forces were 
perceived as more credible and conceptions of “foreign occupation” were fast fading 
away. The United States was regarded as the key player in the operation, and its IO plan 
and execution was a major step toward freeing the locals from the impositions of the 
insurgents. A bonus success of strategic communications was that after the withdrawal of 
the foreign forces, the government and Iraqi military maintained contact with residents 
and continued informing them about their policies and plans to ensure security.97  
There was a close correlation between the events and messages in the war, and 
this was critical in convincing the locals about the aims of the insurgents. For instance, 
handbills had been distributed about the operations of insurgents in Thawra and later the 
insurgents were seen handcuffed. Arrest of the insurgents enhanced understanding of the 
leaflet messages among the local population. From August 25 to November 30, 2008, 
Operation Ironhorse Blizzard marked one of the most effective amalgamations of 
strategic communication, intelligence, combat operations, and non-lethal operations in 
elimination of the enemy groups and capturing of their leaders. The Iraqi army distributed 
printed materials with information on affiliation of insurgent leaders with foreign 
governments and the incompatibility of their activities with ethics of the Islamic religion. 
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On the other hand, other messages informed the population about humanitarian 
assistance, captured criminals, economic development, and arms caches that had been 
discovered.98  
Involvement of local leaders in the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure opened 
further application of IO in identifying areas supporting insurgents. Operation capabilities 
of the insurgents were degraded by the use of IO in conjunction with combat operations. 
Insurgents lost much of the local population support, and their combat vulnerabilities 
increased. Opinions about the reigning government and support by U.S forces improved 
significantly in addition to an 80% reduction of attacks in Iraq. On January 31, 2009, 
provincial elections took place peacefully.99  
D. COMPARISON 
The Vietnam War caused the fragmentation of the U.S. society and damaged its 
reputation and its power to influence citizens at home and abroad. There were anti-
nuclear and anti-war protests as the public felt that they were denied their right to 
information. Secretly waging of the war damaged the economy, demonstrating the 
American power limitations and plunged the country into a period of economic recession. 
Realist scholars argue that the neo-conservative approach adopted in the Vietnam War 
was likely to be used by states which had fallen into “hubris” leading to the pursuit of a 
self-harming “moral crusade” coupled with consumption of resources.100  
Defensive orientation reconciled with military strategy could have served to plan 
and implement the deployment of U.S forces along the Thai border with Vietnam across 
Laos. These strategies may have helped in sealing South Vietnam from the infiltration of 
communists from North Vietnam. It may have served to reduce the deaths of American 
soldiers and the huge amounts of money it cost to wage war. Conventional capabilities of 
the U.S. military forces could have also been leveraged through counter-insurgency 
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bestowed upon the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) with support from other 
forces such as the Australian forces. A counter-insurgency plan was floated by both 
ARVN and some U.S. officers but was rejected by Johnson, who was unwilling to 
mobilize reserves. Failure to mobilize resources hindered effective strategic 
communications during the Vietnam War. The insurgents used their strategic 
communications more effectively than the U.S. government and thus gained the support 
of the local population.101 
In the Vietnam War, the United States had large failings in strategic 
communications and policy formulations. The failure was not realized until the end of the 
war. The coherent objectives of IO in war were lost which led to a plunge into strategic 
defensive posture. Containment doctrine was applied wrongly in Vietnam, and it became 
a fatal war effort as it led to more killings as the insurgents gained more control. 
Harmonization of political and military objectives in any war through strategic 
communications is important in achieving success, as it was in the Cold War. In the Cold 
War, the United States strategized about how to influence undecided nations and woo 
neutral forces. Wooing the local population was important in Vietnam; the U.S operation 
failed in its tentative utilization of IO, which was well used by the insurgents who gained 
control of the war pattern and strategic locations from which they were able to utilize to 
kill more U.S soldiers.102 Convoluted war policies in Vietnam by U.S. officials led to the 
strategic defensive that was not realized in time to adopt an operation that was supported 
by strategic communications. Another mistake made by the United States in the Vietnam 
War is that tactical offensives aimed at eliminating the guerrillas were not sufficient due 
to a lack of information strategies. The main effort of the enemy was not identified and 
instead U.S. forces fought to eliminate the guerillas, which failed. The larger strategy of 
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the North Vietnamese was not analyzed by the United States when formulating its 
operation policies.103  
There were very notable differences between the war in Iraq and the one in 
Vietnam especially in terms of application of IO on the war front. In the Vietnam War, 
even IO in the local population were not facilitated, which sparked protests in the whole 
country on how the resources were being utilized and the approach that led to more 
deaths. In the Iraq War, there was a group of professionals who were involved in policy 
making and providing expert analysis of IO. This made most of the operations successful 
as there was a plan for each. In addition, collaboration with G-7 members enabled access 
to various information materials and coordination of operations from a central position. 
Moreover, in the Iraq operation there was faster analysis of the success of IO, and 
necessary changes were made in time. This was enabled by regular intelligence reports 
that helped identify weaknesses in IO. On the other hand, the approach to the Vietnam 
War was not coordinated as no intelligence reports were analyzed to guide it, and little 
collaboration with the South Vietnamese government occurred. Waging of war was done 
in secret especially during the Johnson era. The addition of troops to fight in Vietnam 
was a decision made solely by the President without any consultation. Reports on 
individuals who had died in the Vietnam War were kept secret limiting the revision of 
approaches and specialization of duties. In contrast, superiority of insurgents on the 
information front was realized early enough in Iraq, and various countermeasures were 
formulated including IO campaigns to reduce radicalization in the populace.104  
Additionally, each IO strategy in Iraq was aimed at a specific group with 
historical information being a major determinant of the strategy. Approach changed from 
floodlight approach to spotlight, and there were identified TAI. The approach in the 
Vietnam War was haphazard with no plan on how to outdo guerillas that were 
dominating on the information front. There were no specific plans for groups and all the 
strategic points were controlled by guerillas which gave the enemy the competitive 
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advantage of striking at any time and controlling the pattern of the war.105 In Iraq, the 
strategic communications succeeded as professionals gave guidance, and there was a 
close correlation between messages sent to the local population before any operation and 
the events that unfolded during and after any operation. This worked to convince the 
residents about the evils of the insurgents. In Vietnam, the approach was to eliminate the 
enemy through combat operations, but due to the control gained by the guerrillas, the 
death toll of American forces increased daily which resulted in the need for a defensive 
strategy for the U.S forces.106  
Double bluff and counter-bluff were used in the terror climate in the Cold War 
supporting the application of IO in the Cold War. Strategic communications assisted in 
winning the ideological battle in the Cold War. Spreading propaganda was explored to try 
and moderate other countries in the war. Additionally, in war that involved many 
countries, information application in winning the war was very important. Professionals 
and politicians were used to form a group of experts to guide IO in the Cold War. The 
policymakers made plans and approved expenditures through a formulation of different 
frameworks. In the Vietnam War, there lacked a specific plan indicating how resources 
were to be used. Troops were sent to the battlefield without any prior IO plans leading to 
the death of many young men from the force as the guerillas already dominated the 
information front. In the Vietnam War, the United States did not have any group experts, 
and the Senate was the body that made decisions on war strategies.107 
During the Cold War, the United States clearly identified the Soviets as a threat. 
Use of effective propaganda at home and abroad changed the paradigm of the war. The 
United States was able to portray the Soviets as a justified, genuine, and legitimate 
enemy.108 In the wake of technological advancement and dynamism of all aspects of war, 
the U.S government realized that the Cold War had to be approached with all strategic 
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communications angles. Psychological warfare was instrumental in convincing neutral 
countries and eliminating the enemies. Support of the American people was very 
important in the Cold War, and that is why the authorities sought to influence the beliefs, 
thoughts, perceptions and actions of the U.S. population. The CIA and the USIA were 
mandated to integrate mechanisms to influence friendly countries and to seek their 
collaboration, as well as the Soviet population. Information about the Cold War was 
relayed to the public, contrary to the Vietnam War where waging war and sending of 
additional troops was secret. An objective transformation of facts was conducted at the 
start and during the Cold War to ensure success of containment strategies. 
Encouragement of other countries into alliances was instrumental in obtaining more 
resources and controlling strategic points in the Cold War. This improved collaboration 
and application of strategic communications.109  
In Vietnam, the strategy was combat operations to eliminate the enemy with no 
collaboration with local forces and residents. There was insufficient information about 
the enemy limiting the United States’ power of the forces in terms of information. 
Guerillas dominated the information front, and this was instrumental in the success of the 
enemy’s operations. The United States lacked prior information on the enemy in the 
Vietnam War and worked primarily to eliminate guerillas through combat operations 
only. In the Vietnam War, the U.S. government had limited information on the guerrillas 
in the country and did not have any IO to try and create moderates and gain support from 
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IV. RADICALIZATION 
Ideally, U.S. strategic communications would counter terrorism before it even 
starts, reaching people before they opt for radicalization and, thus, making them immune 
to recruitment by terrorist organizations or movements.111 “Radical” means as many 
things to as many people as “terrorism” does, however. President Woodrow Wilson, for 
example, took a dim view, noting “by ‘radical,’ I understand one who goes too far.”112 
Paulo Freire, in contrast, finds something laudatory, if not admirable, in the pushing of 
boundaries: 
The more radical the person is, the more fully he or she enters into reality 
so that, knowing it better, he or she can transform it. This individual is not 
afraid to confront, to listen, to see the world unveiled. This person is not 
afraid to meet the people or to enter into a dialogue with them. This person 
does not consider himself or herself the proprietor of history or of all 
people, or the liberator of the oppressed; but he or she does commit 
himself or herself, within history, to fight at their side.113 
In essence, one man’s radical (or terrorist) is another man’s freedom fighter.  
This dual perception of radicalism begins to explain a key shortcoming in U.S. 
strategic communications in the Global War on Terrorism. The United States tends to 
view itself as the bastion of liberty at home and the champion of freedom abroad—called 
again and again to make the world safe for democracy, in another of Wilson’s turns of 
phrase. Not all of those on the receiving end of U.S. intervention share this view, but the 
United States has been slow to recognize, let alone remediate, this gap in and through its 
strategic communications. Instead, as this chapter argues, faulty U.S. strategic 
communications, if anything, fuel the current radicalization process in much of the 
Muslim world.  
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A. ROOT AND TRIGGER CAUSES 
The current scholarship on radicalization, including theoretical work and 
interviews with terrorists and radicalized Muslims, sheds important light on the reasons 
that people radicalize. The radicalization research that has evolved from the earlier first 
generation research that focused on psychological abnormalities now focuses on the 
“root” or “push” and “trigger” or “pull” causes of radicalization. First described by 
Martha Crenshaw as preconditions and precipitants of radicalization in her often cited 
article “The Causes of Terrorism,” prevailing research today focuses on the individual, 
group, and societal causes that can motivate a person to radicalize. Preconditions or 
“push” factors are the “forces that can alienate people or cause them to reject mainstream 
society,” what Crenshaw called enabling or permissive factors.114 For instance, the 
Internet is a platform that is accessible and powerful for sharing and reinforcement of 
radical ideas.  
Precipitants or “pull” factors are forces that appeal to the individual from outside 
sources, typically from propaganda or perceived assaults on a group. Crenshaw states 
these two factors are compounded by modernization, where sophisticated networks of 
transportation and communication favor the emergence of terrorism.115  
Yet there is no clear consensus among scholars on the motivations and pathways 
of an individual who radicalizes. However, Karen Keys-Turner offers a comprehensive 
framework that enhances understanding of the radicalization process and deeply 
integrates the push and pull factors. In her thesis The Violent Islamic Radicalization 
Process: A Framework for Understanding, Keys-Turner summarizes the various model 
types developed as global, situational, social, and psychological or behavioral motivators 
and factors, and places them in what she calls micro-, mid-, and macro-level process 
theories. Micro-level processes are personal factors that motivate radicalization and are 
permissible by culture, ideology, and aligned with personal identity.116  
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Push factors are integrated in Keys-Turner’s mid-level process as they explain 
ideological and psycho-socio factors. Motivational framing issues are contained in 
macro-level processes together with foreign policies and global factors. These augment 
the precipitant factors as they include outside forces. Macro-level models face the same 
problem with theories as those in the micro-level models: a lack of analysis utilizing 
multiple disciplines or factors, which Crenshaw warns about as “terrorists cannot be 
considered in isolation from their social and political context.”117 
1. Micro-Level Processes 
Keys-Turner describes the micro-level as processes that focus primarily on the 
factors particular to the individual, motivated by rational choice, with socio-cultural 
permissive factors that include ideology, culture, and identity as the basis for 
radicalization. Theories that she includes in this process include social identity theory, 
rational choice theory, and the staircase to terrorism metaphor.118 
Henri Tajfel and John Turner first proposed social identity theory in 1979 to help 
describe an individual’s interactions within a social environment based on their group 
membership(s) as a psychological basis for intergroup discrimination. Tajfel and Turner 
argue that groups are what give an individual a sense of social identity and belonging in 
the world, and therefore individuals strive to increase the status of their group(s) to 
increase their own self-image. In the desire to increase their group(s) status, individuals 
will then divide the world into “us” versus “them,” or the in-group versus the out-group, 
where the in-group will then discriminate against the out-group to increase the in-group’s 
self-image.119 
Keys-Turner argues that social identity theory helps “facilitate an understanding 
of the socio-psychological dynamics of individuals and groups” going through the 
radicalization process.120 It is important to understand this dynamic; she cites Schwartz et 
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al., who indicate that cultural, social, and personal identities may be a factor in the 
radicalization process. Certain cultural identities, such as collectivism in Islam, may help 
illustrate the propensity to accept martyrdom in the Muslim world. Social identity 
describes the significance of individuals in their various groups, whereas personal 
identity serves as an individual’s selected or ascribed goals, ethics, and belief system.121  
All of these aspects become important in the radicalization process as an 
individual or group begins to associate the good in themselves with characteristics of 
others, setting up the creation of the us and them groups. With this theory, scholars and 
analysts can better understand the dynamic occurring during an individual or group 
radicalization process as a normal rational occurrence, although perhaps disdainful, rather 
than as the result of pathological and psychological deviance.122 
Rational choice theory (RCT) was originally developed by economists to explain 
the similarities between social and economic exchanges and how individuals will strive to 
maximize an advantage or gain, while minimizing disadvantages or losses. Its basic 
tenets are that human beings are rational by nature and will make rational decisions based 
on the pros and cons of a situation.123 Sociologists and political scientists have also used 
the theory to explain phenomena such as social movements, social mobility, and religion, 
and just like economists they assume that the actors involved will make rational choices 
to maximize their outcomes.124 
In terrorist studies, RCT looks at the social and political aspects of radicalization 
and terrorism and determines that as rational actors, individuals fully consider the various 
psychological and physical variables that could encourage or discourage participation in 
terrorist activities. Crenshaw details this process: 
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One of the most salient attributes of terrorist activity is that it involves 
significant personal danger. Furthermore, since terrorism involves 
premeditated, not impulsive, violence, the terrorist’s awareness of the risks 
is maximized. Thus, although terrorists may simply be people who enjoy 
or disregard risk, it is more likely that they are people who tolerate high 
risk because of intense commitment to a cause. Their commitment is 
strong enough to make the risk of personal harm acceptable and perhaps to 
outweigh the cost of society’s rejection, although defiance of the majority 
may be a reward in itself. In either case, the violent activity is not 
gratifying per se.125 
RCT is useful in exploring the motivations (Crenshaw’s preconditions and precipitants) 
of the radicalization process. Keys-Turner argues that it is this point in the radicalization 
process that becomes most important as the pathway of radicalization leads a person to 
consider action. Per RCT, it is assumed that rational choices will be made based on the 
capabilities and opportunities to determine what action(s) will provide the most desired 
result.126 Following the RCT model and Crenshaw’s work, the expected rational choices 
would attempt to “attract attention for their cause, provoke the government, intimidate 
opponents, appeal for sympathy, impress an audience, or promote the adherence of the 
faithful.”127 
In conjunction with RCT, Keys-Turner points to behavioral psychology and social 
movement theory as corresponding and augmenting RCT in understanding the 
radicalization process. Citing the work of Noricks et al. and Bartlett et al., Keys-Turner 
argues that behaviors are contingent upon consequences, and that individuals operating 
under RCT will choose actions that produce the more desirable consequences. Therefore, 
behaviors and actions on the pathway from radicalization to terrorism that receive 
financial, religious, social status, excitement, friendship, and/or ideological rewards will 
most likely be maintained and may possibly shape future behaviors.128  
On the other hand, Key-Turner notes along with the work of Jamie Bartlett, 
Jonathan Birdwell, and Michael King, that social movement theory advocates argue that 
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terrorists and terrorist groups respond to various stimuli such as social and historical 
conditions, “group and organizational dynamics, personal leadership, group membership, 
and ideological factors” that may produce discontented individuals inside a permissive 
community with a approving ideology.129 All told, including the attacks on 9/11, RCT 
and the various corresponding micro-level theories point to terrorist violence as a rational 
response to the preconditions and precipitants in place as a means of primarily pursuing 
publicity and support of the terrorist cause, and not as a means to commit violent acts.130  
Fathali Moghaddam’s “staircase to terrorism” metaphor is a description of the 
radicalization process utilizing the image of a narrowing staircase inside a building as the 
psychological steps an individual makes on a pathway to possibly committing a terrorist 
act. The assumption Moghaddam made when creating this metaphor is that it only 
provides a general framework to organize and direct future research and policy based on 
current psychological knowledge of terrorists, not a formal model to be compared against 
others. In it, everyone starts on the ground floor, and an individual’s choice to continue to 
climb the staircase or get off on a particular floor is determined by how the individual 
perceives the building and what doors they think are open to them. Each floor, depicted 
in Figure 1, is characterized by a distinct psychological process in the pathway to 
radicalization and eventually terrorism.131 
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Figure 1.  Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism 
 
Source: Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of 
Conceptual Models and Empirical Research,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 
(2011): 40. 
The metaphor envisions a step-by-step progression through each psychological 
process and with each step taken up the staircase the individual becomes increasingly 
radicalized. By the time an individual reaches the fifth floor—the terrorist act and 
sidestepping inhibitory mechanisms—they are “psychologically prepared and motivated 
to commit acts of terrorism, sometimes resulting in multiple civilian deaths.”132 
Moghaddam argues that to understand the actions of the few who actually climb all the 
way to the top, researchers and policymakers must understand the “conditions of life and 
the perceptions of justice among the millions on the ground floor.”133 So instead of trying 
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to figure out the profile of likely terrorists, Moghaddam asserts we must focus instead on 
the conditions that directly lead to terrorist activity in the first place. 
For example, individual factors were evident in the July 7, 2005, bombing in the 
UK. The perpetrators were individuals who were not appropriately absorbed into the UK 
society and therefore were easy targets for Salafist propaganda freely and easily 
disseminated in the Muslim Diaspora in the UK. There had been relatively little 
assimilation, and their economic and ideological backgrounds had not been altered 
sufficiently. Individual choice to act violently or uphold radicalization in a culturally 
different environment explains the difficulty of prediction of radicalization behavior.134  
2. Mid-Level Processes 
Mid-level theories rely on a psycho-sociological and ideological basis, 
emphasizing the state-level social structures that can cause radicalization motivations. 
The mid-level process now moves to factors that directly influence an individual in the 
immediate environment. These are second to individual factors in the micro-level as an 
individual interacts with them in making a choice.135 
McCauley and Moskalenko’s model attempts to show how radicalization is “a 
dimension of increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors” across twelve 
“mechanisms” based on the grievances of individuals, groups, and the public.136 They 
note that radicalization can occur at any of the three levels, with personal and identity-
group grievances radicalizing individuals, and by conflict with states and other political 
groups radicalizing mass publics and groups. Their model, depicted in Figure 2, shows 
the twelve mechanisms that they use to describe how individuals or groups proceed down 
the path of radicalization.137  
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Figure 2.  Pathways to Violence: Mechanisms of Political Radicalization at 
Individual, Group, and Mass Public Levels 
 
Source: Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political 
Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 
(2008): 418. 
McCauley and Moskalenko propose that radicalization is primarily a gradual 
process along a “slippery slope” as opposed to moving from sympathy to extremism in a 
single step. An example of a single step into radicalization is Wafa Idriss, the first 
Palestinian female suicide bomber, who carried out her mission within two weeks of 
making the decision to be a bomber.138 An example of gradual radicalization is cited by 
della Porta who quotes a militant from Italy: “A choice [made] in cold blood, such as 
‘now I will become a terrorist,’ [did] not exist. It was a step-by-step evolution, which 
passed through a kind of human relation that I had with Guido, and with the people I 
worked with.”139  
Citing the experiments of Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo, McCauley and 
Moskalenko show the power of self-persuasion in a person’s ability to justify his or her 
own behavior down a path of self-radicalization. They also recognize the power of 
personal and political grievances, as well as the emotions of love and fear to show how 
various personal factors play into the radicalization process for individuals. For example, 
the 9/11 attack sought to energize Muslims affected the by presence of U.S. troops in 
                                                 
138 Ibid., 415-8. 
139 Donatella Della Porta, Social movement, political violence and the state: a comparative analysis of 
Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 168. 
 48 
Saudi Arabia, as well as to strike terror in the “enemy’s” backyard as a reason for 
radicalization. The removal of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia was also a reason for the 
attack, indicating political and personal grievances.140 
At the group and mass public level, McCauley and Moskalenko’s work focuses 
on how risk-taking, competition, cohesion, fissioning, and status influence how groups 
progress and evolve along the radicalization path.141 Risk-taking is conducted to advance 
causes of a large group as there are benefits of taking the risk available to all members. 
Hence taking the risk for the group includes letting other individuals pay the cost or 
benefitting from the advance of the group from the risky activity. Cohesion involves a 
generalization of group dynamics, increasing sanctions for deviates, respect for leaders, 
and idealization of norms. On the other hand, competition for the sympathizers’ base can 
result in more radical actions as in the case of the Armenian Secret Army. However, 
competition within the group may lead to fissioning with each splinter group trying to 
gain more sympathizers through extremist activities. Power status by different group 
leaders may strengthen a group in radicalization through support and provision of 
resources by sympathizers accorded as a result of the status of the leader.142 
The authors conclude that “the degree to which radicalization of non-state groups 
occurs in response to the actions of others must be the starting point for understanding 
these groups.”143 They note that radicalization is the reaction of individuals, groups, and 
masses to the actions of the state. But its focus on internal “mechanisms” is a limitation 
as it does not recognize observable behavioral indicators that can be used to interrupt or 
stop the radicalization process.  
McCauley and Moskalenko’s study of radicalization does not just apply to 
external factors and personalities. Following the attacks of September 11th, the New 
York Police Department went through a fundamental shift in policing efforts, switching 
the focus of their Intelligence Division from old crime endeavors, such as counter-drugs 
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and racketeering, to one focused on stopping the next terrorist attack. Part of the task 
included the hiring of new intelligence analysts, two of whom, Silber and Bhatt, wrote a 
report, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, to try and understand the 
radicalization process in order to prevent future attacks. Comparing ten cases of 
homegrown Western terrorist plots, they developed a four-step model to describe the 
homegrown radicalization process, shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3.  The Radicalization Process 
 
Source: Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown 
Threat (New York: New York Police Department Intelligence Division, 2007), 21. 
The root cause of the process, the authors argue, is adoption of the Jihadi-Salafi 
ideology during the self-identification phase, where the individual is largely influenced 
by both internal and external factors and association with individuals who share the same 
views.144 Political and religious views are the main factors involved in radicalization. 
Religious views of holy war, popularly known as “Jihad,” are a great contributor to the 
radicalization process. On the other hand, following the political views of an influential 
person has been identified as a significant reason for radicalization. For instance, 
Shahawar Siraj from Brooklyn was exposed to extremist literature that cemented the 
Herald Square plotter’s political views leading to his radicalization.145  
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The next step, indoctrination, is where an individual “wholly adopts Jihadi-Salafi 
ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist 
where action is required to support and further the Salafi cause.”146 For example, 
Shahawar Siraj was visited by James Elshafay to seek religious guidance. Together they 
watched Jihad videos and read texts claiming Jews were on the verge of taking over the 
global economy.  
Last, the Jihadization phase is where the individual fully accepts and commits to 
their duty to act on behalf of the cause. Muslims in various institutions in the diaspora 
can be engaged in IO that is exclusive to them in order to understand their religious, 
economic, and political views. Engaging the Muslims could offer more insights into 
various models of changing wrong perceptions and the spread of extremist ideas.147  
Strategic communication can come in at this stage by first invoking assimilation 
strategies and eliminating marginalization to prevent indoctrination and reversal of the 
biased thought. Use of these strategies could create moderate thought in diaspora 
Muslims and would go a long way in preventing potential indoctrination. In Jihadization, 
assimilation must be carried out effectively as religious identity sometimes supersedes 
the assimilation process. Strategic communication needs alignment into the needs of our 
present diverse society and in dealing with the threat from within, as homegrown 
terrorists pose the greatest security threat.  
Silber and Bhatt caveat their theory by stating that “all individuals who begin this 
process do not necessarily pass through all the stages and many, in fact, stop or abandon 
this process at different points. Moreover, although this model is sequential, individuals 
do not always follow a perfectly linear progression.”148 Another facet of the model was 
what the authors termed “radicalization incubators,” places both physical and on the 
Internet that provide the extremist fuel for the radicalization process. However, this as 
well as the model’s focus on religious behaviors earned it the term “religious conveyor 
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belt” theory due to the accusation that it led to religious profiling of the Muslim 
community. This profiling or marginalization causes the spread of untrue perceptions and 
influences locals to join the line of thought increasing the danger of homegrown 
terrorists. Radicalization of locals is enabled by interaction between extremist Muslims in 
the diaspora with local community members in schools, hospitals, at entertainment 
events, and in other social places.149  
3. Macro-Level Processes 
At the macro-level, such motivational issues as ideology, global factors as 
military affairs and foreign policy issues form the basis for radicalization process.150 
Globalization is the growth of international interdependence across a spectrum of 
cultural, economic, political, social, and technological realms. Taking the forms of 
Westernization, secularization, democratization, consumerism, and free market 
capitalism, some argue that globalization has caused an increased control by the wealthier 
“Western” nations, specifically the United States, over the poorer undeveloped nations of 
the world. Some critics also argue that globalization has undermined democracy and 
cultural homogenization, especially in countries with large poor populations. A feeling of 
being excluded from the benefits of globalization is given as a reason for involvement in 
radicalization in poor societies. Social segregation and discrimination induces a feeling of 
isolation and can be a prominent reason for radicalization.151  
Audrey Cronin asserts that globalization can cause conservative cultures to view 
the changes as a corruption of their customs, religion, and language and a destruction of 
their cultural and social identity. For instance, integration of the Western education 
system into Muslim cultural practices through scholarships and a change of curriculum 
may be seen by fundamentalists as a plan to destroy their identity. This trend is 
exacerbated by another aspect of globalization, the increased use of global 
communications, such as the Internet, and a greater choice of media sources. With a 
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greater ability to communicate, grievances from immigrant homelands and Diaspora 
populations can be more easily—and more widely—spread back and forth, further 
inflaming the notions of alienation and assaults on cultural identities in those groups.152  
Due to the perceived inundation of Western values and cultures, the feeling of 
being left behind by the promises of globalization, and a frustration of a populace that has 
not been given a feasible alternative by their own government, this “new” terrorism being 
waged against the effects of globalization is believed to be a response to reassert cultural 
identity against the threat of a homogenous world. Although social identity, as shown 
earlier, can be an important factor in the radicalization process, no one factor, such as 
globalization, is the sole cause of radicalization, and Cronin argues it would be an 
oversimplification to limit the motivations of Al Qaeda and others as simply an antipathy 
to the forces of globalization.153 
First used to describe Babylon’s dispersing of Jews after their captivity in the 5th 
century B.C., the word “diaspora” is now used to refer to any group that lives in a foreign 
country but still has a strong bond with the home nation.154  Therefore, some of the same 
issues brought up with globalization can be present in diaspora Muslim communities as 
well that include Pakistani Muslims, Turkish Muslims, and North African Muslims in 
Western countries; these groups may thus be more susceptible to grievances from their 
home country as well as their host country–perhaps a double motivation for 
radicalization.  
Muqtedar Khan and John Esposito identify the two greatest pressures on and in 
these diaspora populations: marginalization and assimilation. Marginalizing the Muslim 
diaspora disempowers and reduces their influence and rights. Special surveillance of 
mosques in New York City or policies and practices that single out the “Muslim-looking” 
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population in the United States contribute to the sense of marginalization among resident 
Muslims155  
Assimilation, on the other hand, tries to force a reformation in Islam and to 
secularize Muslims to such an extent that they no longer are different from their host 
nation. France has made an express policy of assimilation, and the idea of assimilation (as 
opposed to integration) has inspired lengthy and unresolved debates elsewhere in the 
European Union. Amid these two forces disharmony prevails and divides Muslim 
communities internally and also separates them from the mainstream society around 
them. In these neglected corners, radicalization festers and spreads, providing a source of 
fundraising, support, and recruitment in the very Western nations that Al Qaeda wishes to 
attack. In a word, the forces of marginalization and assimilation could be creating a fifth 
column of disaffected Muslim immigrants far more numerous and versed in Western 
society than Al Qaeda planners overseas could hope.156 
B. SUMMATION OF THE LEVELS  
Mid-level process theories have helped redirect future research to focus on multi-
faceted approaches that are better at answering the various motivations of radicalization. 
However, these theories still have failed to address all modes of radicalization, and in the 
case of the Silber and Bhatt model, may actually have helped to increase radicalization in 
Muslim diaspora communities. 
Although there is no single theory that can explain all aspects of the radicalization 
process, many psychologists and social scientists have viewed similar markers or stages 
in the radicalization process that motivate extremists. Crenshaw suggests that “the 
opportunity for action, the need to belong, the desire for social status, and the acquisition 
of material reward” are common motivators for radicals and terrorists, whereas Borum 
points to perceived injustices, a need for identity, and belonging as the common 
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vulnerabilities and perceptions shared among many radicals and terrorists.157 In 
conjunction with root causes, Dipak Gupta argues that the radicalization process is aided 
by certain trigger causes such as “when a leader gives voice to the frustration by 
formulating a well-defined social construction of collective identity and paints in vivid 
color the images of ‘us’ and ‘them.’”158 Yet not everyone who shares or experiences one 
of the common markers or stages of radicalization or is exposed to a triggering agent 
becomes a terrorist. However, as Fergal Keane and the U.S. Army argue, even those 
radicals that do not become active terrorists can assist in the actions and success of a 
terrorist organization by becoming active or passive supporters.159 
Successful terrorist groups understand this dynamic and actively recruit in areas 
where the perception of injustice is high by utilizing social networks and interpersonal 
relationships to impart a sense of urgency and need for action. The terrorist organization 
increases the number of active and sympathetic members, which increases the group’s 
financial, political, and popular support enabling the group to conduct and sustain their 
operations. Therefore, by reducing the number of people who radicalize, many scholars 
conclude that this will reduce the capability and effectiveness of terrorist organizations’ 
operations and longevity.160 
C. JIHADI ROOT AND TRIGGER CAUSES 
Understanding that there are certain root and trigger causes that aid in the 
radicalization process is a valuable first step in fighting the process. Although it will not 
end radicalization totally, reducing the political, social, and economic factors that are the 
underlying root causes can help in reducing the popular support that some Jihadi terrorist 
organizations enjoy. The problem is that distinguishing the root and trigger causes for 
terrorism is not an easy endeavor due to the complex and diverse nature of the 
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radicalization process. The first step in understanding the underlying root and trigger 
causes is to try and view the problem from the enemies’ eyes. Prior to his death, and 
during the early years of the War on Terror, Osama bin Laden laid out Al Qaeda’s social 
construction on why they were at war with the United States: 
U.S. support for Israel that keeps Palestinians in the Israelis’ thrall. U.S. 
and other Western troops on the Arabian Peninsula. U.S. occupation of 
Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. support for Russia, India, and China against 
their Muslim militants. U.S. pressure on Arab energy producers to keep oil 
prices low. U.S. support for apostate, corrupt, and tyrannical Muslim 
governments.161 
Although not every radical or terrorist holds all of these causes as the reason why 
they conduct or support Al Qaeda in its attacks against the United States, interviews 
when available, and statistics of known terrorists seem to support bin Laden’s claims. 
Christopher Hewitt and Jessica Kelley-Moore point to a comment from a Palestinian 
captured in Iraq on why he would travel such a distance when he could fight the Israelis 
at home: “they are one and the same enemy, and if we succeed in defeating the U.S. here, 
it will be the beginning of the end for the Jewish state.”162  
The two authors also compared the data of suicide bombers in Iraq to the data 
analyzed by Robert Pape in his book Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide 
Terrorism, and concluded that Muslim nations with a high level of U.S. or Israeli military 
occupation produce a disproportionately higher amount of suicide bombers than Muslim 
nations with no occupation.163 Hewitt, Moore, and Alan Krueger also show that Jihadists 
tend to originate from countries with low levels of civil liberties. They point out that 
Turkey and Indonesia, the two Muslim nations with relatively higher levels of civil 
liberties, have had the fewest Jihadists per capita, whereas countries such as Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan, nations that have the strong support of the United 
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States but have low levels of civil liberties and freedoms, produce higher numbers of 
Jihadi terrorists.164  
The fact that most suicide bombers emanate from countries with a heavy presence 
of U.S. and Israeli troops is a clear indication of failure of strategic communications in 
winning the war on terrorism. In addition, strong support of Islamic states by the United 
States is a determinant factor in the spread of terrorist activities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Qatar, and Jordan. With low levels of civil liberties, the interpretation is that the strong 
support accorded to these countries by the United States is not sufficiently founded on 
tenets of strategic communication.165  
Jason Burke also points to the United States’ invasion and occupation as 
motivators for the influx of Jihadists into Iraq, pointing to the stories of two Saudis, 
Hizam al-Ghatani and Mohammed al-Fawzan, as examples of the diversity of foreign 
fighters that sought to fight the United States in Iraq. Al-Ghatani, a 26-year-old, 
impoverished and poorly educated shop keeper from Saudi Arabia left his family to travel 
to Iraq to fight against the Americans because of what he saw on television, “the 
aggression against civilians, the children being killed, and the air attacks.”166 He was not 
a religious ideologue, nor did he have a positive view of Al Qaeda or the attacks on 
September 11th, but he felt that he needed to fight the Americans in Iraq to fight what he 
believed was unfair aggression. Al-Fawzan, on the other hand, was a 35-year-old man 
from a wealthy family. A self-confessed partygoer, who was more interested in soccer 
than Islam, al-Fawzan also blamed the images he saw on television for his decision to 
travel to Iraq to fight against the United States. Clearly the United States—and its 
mission in Iraq—came across differently than Washington expected.167 
Although support for Al Qaeda and its war against the United States and the West 
has only garnered lukewarm support over the past decade, most Muslim countries’ 
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populations view the United States and its policies in the region with even less support. 
The bombings in Istanbul in 2003, with their Western and Jewish targets, show how U.S. 
and allied policies are a driving factor in the radicalization process of Muslims 
worldwide. Turkey, a Muslim nation that historically has prided itself on its secular pro-
Western attitudes, including more than six decades as a member in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, and where bin Laden’s popularity has never reached higher than 15 
percent, saw two synagogues, a British-owned bank, and the British consulate bombed 
leaving 58 people dead. During the investigation, one of the Turkish militants described 
the bombers’ actions and their views in harmony with those of Al Qaeda. It is also telling 
that the planning and execution was known to at least 400 Turks, who passively 
acquiesced to the attack and said nothing to the authorities.168  
As Burke notes, “many of the precepts underpinning the extremists’ worldview 
were taking hold on a much wider population.”169 The fact that extremists’ viewpoints 
are spreading is a clear indication of a need for change in strategic communication in the 
war against terrorism. There is a requirement for consideration of change in strategic 
communicating due to dynamism of models used by extremists. Improving strategic 
communication and modernizing it is pivotal in ensuring a lasting solution to terrorism 
activities as it will serve to contain radicalization and homegrown terrorists.  
D. FAILURE OF U.S. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 
For the U.S. government, it is important to understand the problem from a more 
global perspective. Success of American global policy should be based on attitudes and 
views of foreign populations. There have been significant failures in the U.S. strategic 
communications which are evident in the radicalization and marginalization examples 
presented in this chapter. Pew Global Attitudes Survey indicates that 80 percent of the 
population in Muslim countries have negative views of the United States. The main 
problem is with American foreign policy; it is the main cause for negative sentiments. In 
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such countries as Turkey, Jordan, and Morocco that are more moderate, negative 
sentiments are even higher.170  
The Boston marathon attack may indicate a lack of assimilation in the U.S. 
Muslim population aided by a failure in U.S. strategic communications. Marginalization 
was a major causal factor in influencing the Tsarnaev brothers, the Boston Marathon 
bombers, to subscribe to extremist ideologies. The eldest brother, Tamerlan, had become 
radicalized through a lack of assimilation in the American culture. He claimed to lack any 
American friends and abhorred the degradation of Western values and the lack of 
American’s self-control. It is believed his radicalization process was cemented by 
traveling to Chechnya in 2012, where he was able to reconnect with family and their 
culture, but also with their feeling of persecution, a sentiment to which he was 
particularly susceptible.171  
The Tsarnaev case thus stands in for a broader failure in assimilation and 
incorporation of diverse cultures and religions into foreign policies. The 9/11 attack 
sought to sympathize with the Islamic population affected by the presence of U.S. troops 
in what Al Qaeda called Muslim land in Saudi Arabia and striking terror in the enemy’s 
backyard. Strategic communication in foreign policy had failed in changing perception 
and modeling a moderate mindset among the Muslim population in Saudi Arabia. 
Moreover, radicalized individuals had negative sentiments about military presence in 
Islamic states.  
There is a great deal of literature in both physical and digital libraries regarding 
radicalization. Shahawar Siraj’ from New York influenced James Elshafay into 
radicalization through evidence from such materials. If Elshafay had prior information 
regarding extremist strategies and recruiting methods, he may have opted out. Lack of 
information on the recruitment strategies and methods adopted by extremists, among the 
public, indicates a lack of strategies to inform the local populace of misguiding literature 
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used by extremists. U.S. strategic communication lacks a plan to deal with homegrown 
radicalization caused by extremist individuals living in the diaspora.172 
The emergence of suicide bombers from countries mostly supported by the United 
States and with low levels of civil liberties and those with a heavy presence of U.S. 
military is a clear indication of failed strategic communications to influence the 
perceptions of local populations regarding extremism and the objective of our support. 
U.S. foreign policy in such nations is only focused toward eliminating terrorists and 
supporting local communities without modeled communication strategies that seek to 
understand the religion, culture, and social paradigms important for moderate thinking. 
The bombings in Istanbul in 2003, with their Western and Jewish targets, show how U.S. 
and allied policies are a driving factor in the radicalization process of Muslims 
worldwide.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Scholars and journalists like Audrey Cronin and Jason Burke note that there is a 
deeper conflict at play in the Muslim community than just a hatred of the foreign policy 
of the United States and the West. They argue that what is really going on is a war within 
Islam itself being waged to determine which ideology in the faith will be adopted, and 
that this is not the first time it has happened. Their theories may hold some truth, as Kofi 
Annan said “we should not pretend that… the decision to resort to terrorism is unrelated 
to the political, social, and economic situation in which people find themselves. But we 
are mistaken if we assume, equally, that terrorists are mere products of their environment. 
The phenomenon is more complex than that.”173 However, it is hard not to see that U.S. 
words and actions are having a negative effect on the situation. U.S. actions are aiding Al 
Qaeda in recruiting and radicalizing thousands of Muslims who normally would have no 
desire to help or aid Al Qaeda and its ideology.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis analyzes the policies and strategic communications of the United 
States in the war against Islamic fundamentalists from September 11, 2001, to the present 
to determine if the United States’ strategic communication policies have been effective in 
countering Islamic extremism. From the findings, it is evident that U.S. strategic 
communications have failed in countering radicalization and moderating the minds of 
Muslim populations overseas—or among diaspora populations in Western countries. It is 
important to tailor strategic communications from a central point but extend resources to 
counter radicalization in various fronts and social environments. Distribution of 
competencies between the Pentagon, the DOS, and the CIA can limit the faster and 
strategic analysis of action areas in fighting radicalization and global terror groups. There 
are various individuals who are involved deciding the various TAI in different countries 
and offering expert information about the dynamism of terror groups. The group of 
professionals and resources should be put together as in the Cold War to enhance 
coordination of both human and material resources.  
Based on the findings of this thesis, the following recommendations are proposed 
in support of U.S. strategic communications efforts in war against Islamic 
fundamentalism. Reinstatement of the USIA is important for analysis of radicalization 
trends and prediction of future terrorists’ activities. Active promotion of moderate 
thought among Muslims living in various regions of the globe through strategic 
communication is critical in reducing radicalization. From the examples highlighted in 
this study, it is evident that extremist worldviews are spreading across a wider population 
compared to the last century where extremism was particularly confined to the Middle 
East. This is evident in cases such as the Boston bomb attack where the perpetrator was a 
home-grown terrorist. The findings further indicate that it has become easier to access 
materials and information propagating extremist ideas either through written print or 
visual media. Additionally, it is evident that negative perceptions of the United States are 
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spreading even in countries that were thought to be moderate such as Turkey, Jordan, and 
Morocco.174 
Models applied in the Cold War to woo neutral nations and influence friendly 
countries should be used in obtaining support from Muslim governments in terms of 
human resources and building of strong bases for strategic communications. Integration 
of institutions of higher learning in the war against radicalization is important as its most 
elite can be trusted by their home population to guide them in the right way.175  
Collaboration with Muslim institutions can be applied in modeling curricula that 
develop moderate thoughts regarding U.S. involvement in fighting the global war on 
terror. Reversing the negative views about the United Sates is pivotal toward realizing the 
objectives of strategic communications in countering radicalization. This is because the 
reduction of negative sentiments about the United States will enhance the effectiveness of 
modeled approaches against the Al Qaeda network and in developing moderates among 
the Muslim population. 
There are two important similarities shared between the Cold War of the last 
century and the current war against Al Qaeda. The first similarity is an opposing hostile 
ideology and the second similarity is the need of an effective strategic communications 
plan to help wage the war. In the fight against international terrorism, the United States 
and other Western countries have yet to draw important conclusions.  
It is imperative for the U.S. government to restructure its strategic 
communications to effectively fight hostile ideologies. Hostile ideologies held by 
individuals in the Islamic world can be eliminated through strategic communication that 
is not solely directed toward countering anti-American sentiments. In the process of 
countering hostile ideologies, the objective should be to induce the populace involved 
into disregarding the pursuit of terrorist activities and destruction of the West. Strategic 
communications should aim at convincing Muslims that terrorist activities and 
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175 Alex P. Schmid, Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual 
Discussion and Literature Review (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013), 41. 
 63 
destruction of the West only represent militant extremist ravings and such activities are 
unacceptable. This approach is an imperative part of information operations necessary in 
winning wars.  
There are also some important differences. First, unlike the Cold War, the United 
States is not trying to contain an enemy state; rather it is countering a religiously backed 
movement. Second, some Muslim societies are not as receptive as citizens from the 
former Soviet Union and communist countries to alternative viewpoints. Third, many 
Muslims also feel that the U.S. presence in the Middle East is a violation of their 
sovereignty and is not welcome. Fourth, Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are dynamic 
and regularly change their tactics to counter U.S. strategic communication operations in 
the region. Last, today’s modern communications are exponentially quicker in 
disseminating information while offering the user greater choices in how and what 
information is shared.176  
In addition, past IO strategies should be revised and aligned with changing war 
aspects. Formation of separate institutions to deal with strategic communications in 
religious-backed militants will facilitate integration with think tanks, foundations, and 
institutions of higher learning in the Islamic world. This enhances modeling of moderate 
thought through IO on individuals trusted by most fundamentalists.  
Yet even with those differences, there are vital lessons learned from both 
successes and failures of the U.S. strategic communication efforts during the Cold War 
that can aid the United States in its current war against Al Qaeda. First and foremost, 
Washington must develop and implement an effective strategic communication plan that 
encompasses all aspects of a state’s power wisely, as this will greatly assist in achieving 
the state’s objectives. Second, sound leadership is required. The President must make 
strategic communication a priority and set a national strategy that will promote U.S. 
interests and security by focusing U.S. hard and soft power on helping the terrorists 
defeat themselves. The United States can utilize its strategic communication tools to 
succeed in this by pointing to the inherent contradictions, hypocrisies, internal divisions, 
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and other shortcomings of terrorist organizations the same way it did against the Soviet 
Union.  
Third, establish and develop a government-wide definition and doctrine of the 
terms. End the confusion on what strategic communication is or is not, so that it becomes 
easier for the whole of government to engage in it. The definition provided by 
Christopher Paul and cited in this work is a good starting point, but whatever definition is 
decided on must include all the tools at the nation’s disposal to inform, influence, or 
persuade the target audience. Last, understand and target the desired audience. 
Insurgencies and terrorism require the support of the people to survive. Identify foreign 
populations that are vulnerable to anti-American messages and propaganda, and focus the 
strategic communication efforts on them. This threat is global, and therefore so must be 
the scope of the U.S. strategic communication efforts.177  
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